The Impact of Family Control and Board Characteristics on Corporate Policies
來源
管理學報
作者
Yenn-Ru Chen ; Chen-Yin Ho
年份
2009
資料性質
英文
出版者
社團法人中華民國管理科學學會
出版地
台北
冊數
26卷1期
頁數
P1 - 16
相關連結
簡介
There exist two opposite arguments of family control. The interest-alignment hypothesis that suggests family control leads to efficient business operations; on the other hand, the entrenchment hypothesis claims a higher likelihood of asset expropriation due to the existence of a deviation between control and ownership. The literature documents that ownership concentration in Taiwan is higher than the Asian average, and that Taiwanese firms are mostly controlled by some families/groups via the active participation on boards and management appointments. The decisions made by insiders would thus be highly influenced by family control and board characteristics. This study comprehensively analyzes the effects of family control and board characteristics on major corporate policies, and confirms the endogenous relations among major corporate policies. We find that family-controlled firms are conservative in formulating dividend, compensation, and investment policies. The impact of board characteristics, especially director ownership, the proportion of director-ownership-in-pledge and the proportion of independent directors, on firm policies differs between family-controlled and non family-controlled firms. Furthermore, the study shows that the proportion of director-ownership-in-pledge plays a very important role in the behavior of controlling families affecting corporate policies.